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A COGNITIVE VIEW OF EVOLUTIVE REFERENTS 
Alfons A. MAES
Abstract
This article aims at discussing the question of how an evolutive referent can be
defined from a cognitive point of view. After an introduction on the
relationship between evolutive referents and cognitive discourse reference, and
after a short survey of the essential components of the cognitive framework
used, the article presents a tentative cognitive definition of evolutive referents.
This definition is used in the remainder of the article to investigate what exactly
transforms a referent into an evolutive referent and where to draw the
distinction between normal incrementation of referents and referent evolution.
The basic ingredient of the definition, i.e. reconceptualization of referents, is
discussed in relation to two empirical cases which might be considered to be
evolutive to a certain extent, i.e. VHPDQWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ transformations and
UROHYDOXH transformations. Finally the usefulness of the notion of
reconceptualization is demonstrated in a descriptive analysis of different
referential strategies in a corpus of 25 recipes for apple sauce taken from 25
different Dutch cookbooks.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Topics in recent cognitive theories of discourse reference
A major concern in cognitively oriented work on discourse reference is the
attempt to reveal the mechanisms underlying referentially coherent texts.
Recent cognitive work in the field of discourse reference aims at describing the
ways in which discourse referents are introduced and maintained and
explaining the relationship between discourse referents and referential
expressions. An important cognitive starting point for investigating referential
coherence is the claim that the mental activation level of discourse referents is
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the basic determinant or ‘predictor’ of the form of referential expressions in
discourse; in other words: the form of referential expressions is indicative of
the mental activation or the ‘attentional status’ of the underlying discourse
referent. Studying reference from a cognitive point of view requires uncovering
the different factors which determine the mental activation of referents.
The idea that discourse entities have a certain degree of mental activation or
prominence is the basis of a large number of cognitive notions which can be
found in the literature on discourse reference of the past few decades. An
incomplete (and exclusively Anglo-Saxon) selection: accessibility (e.g. Ariel,
1988; 1990; 1994), mutual knowledge (Clark & Marshall, 1981), referent
activation  (Tomlin & Ming Ming Pu, 1991),  topic continuity (Givón, 1989;
1983), (explicit vs. implicit) focus  (Garrod & Sanford, 1982), attentional state
(Grosz & Sidner, 1986), mutual cognitive environment (Sperber & Wilson,
1986:38-46; Hawkins, 1991:413), givenness  (e.g. Prince, 1981; Gundel,
Hedberg & Zacharski, 1993), mutual belief  (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986),
focus (Sidner, 1983), centering (Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein, 1995).
These notions differ considerably in their theoretical definition, claims and
ambition, but they all capture the basic idea that each utterance in natural
discourse exhibits an ‘informational asymmetry’ (Prince, 1981), in that it
contains information elements with different degrees of givenness or newness.
This asymmetry is the empirical basis for discourse referents differing in their
degree of prominence. The cognitive plausibility of this idea can be
substantiated by the simple intuition that each utterance contains signals which
enables language users to determine which of the referents is the most likely
candidate for being the most central element in the next utterance; we all of us
have a calculated prediction on what is the most likely interpretation of KH in
the second sentence of (1).
(1) John went home with Peter. He...
Most research attention has been given to anaphors, i.e. expressions which have
an explicit (and preferably a nominal) antecedent in previous discourse.  Within
the functional class of anaphors, there is a clear preference to focus attention on
two main subtypes: pronominal as opposed to nominal anaphors. Many
proposals, experimental as well as analytical, relate pronominal anaphors to
prominent entities, for which many different terms can be found: explicit-focus
referents (Garrod & Sanford, 1982:27), high-focus-level actors (Reichman,
1978:311), given referents (Clark & Haviland, 1977:27; Chafe, 1976),
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maintenance of referents  (Marslen-Wilson, Levy & Tyler, 1982:351), current
entities (Yule, 1981:49), protagonists (Francik, 1985:59; Anderson et al.,
1983:433), thematic subjects (Karmiloff-Smith, 1980:235), topical referents
(Linde, 1979), backward looking centers (Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein, 1995),
focal elements (Grosz & Sidner, 1986), etc. Conversely, nominal anaphors are
often associated with lesser  prominent referents and contextual conditions
which decrease referent prominence (such as competing candidates or
referential distance), although nominal anaphora can do much more than
expressing low prominence status, as can be seen in e.g. Maes, 1990, 1996;
Maes & Noordman, 1995. Apart from these dichotomic proposals which focus
on the functional value of two types of referential expressions, other proposals
try to give a more detailed view in that they offer some kind of referential
hierarchy, consisting of different types of referential expressions (e.g. Ariel’s
accessibility scale), or different degrees of mental activation states (e.g.
Prince’s taxonomy of assumed familiarity) or on the combination of these two
(e.g. Gundel et al.’s givenness hierarchy). 
So, within a cognitively oriented perspective on discourse reference, the
association of referent prominence and expression type is uncontroversial. The
interesting question now is how referent prominence is triggered, established or
modified. What makes one referent more activated or prominent than another?
In the literature on discourse reference,  an interesting variation of methods,
proposals and claims can be seen which all result in the conclusion that the
mental activation of referents is affected by a complicated conglomerate of
variables. In these proposals, conclusions about the prominence level of
referents are based predominantly on the processing effort  associated with
anaphors or the adequacy of different types of anaphors. The variables which
are said to determine referent prominence range from purely surface based
discourse determinants to conceptual factors which are much more knowledge
or memory based. An incomplete survey:
& PRUSKRORJLFDOIDFWRUV, such as the number and the gender of the
antecedent (Ehrlich, 1980);
& V\QWDFWLFIDFWRUV such as subject function (Gordon, Grosz & Gilliom,
1993), syntactic prominence of antecedents (Ward, Sproat & Mc Koon,
1991), depth of embedding (Matthews & Chodorow, 1988);
& variables affecting the OLQHDURUGHULQJRIUHIHUHQWV in discourse, such as
the position of the antecedent as first NP of the sentence (Gordon, Grosz
& Gilliom, 1993), the distance between antecedent and anaphor (e.g.
Ariel, 1988; Givon, 1983), shifts between surface discourse units, i.e.
paragraphs (Clancy, 1980) or shifts between visual units (Tomlin, 1987;
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Tomlin & Ming Ming Pu, 1991);
& factors affecting the QDWXUHRIWKHSURSRVLWLRQV involved, such as the
implicit causality of verbs (Caramazza, Grober, Garvey & Yates, 1977).
& factors affecting the FRQFHSWXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIGLVFRXUVH LQIRUPDWLRQ,
such as episode shifts (Anderson, Garrod & Sanford, 1983), changes in
point of view (Clancy, 1980),  protagonist or topicality status of
referents. (Francik, 1985:29; Karmiloff-Smith, 1980:248; Morrow,
1985).
Recent studies have demonstrated that surface variables can be overruled by
more conceptual variables. Gernsbacher (1991) and Carreiras & Gernsbacher
(1992) showed that morphologically singular but semantically plural
antecedents are processed more easily when they are referred to by a plural
anaphor. This means that the morphological surface characteristics of the
antecedent are overruled by the semantic conceptualization of the referent.
Moreover, there is growing evidence that different variables interact in
establishing prominence levels of discourse referents. Hence, Garrod,
Freudenthal & Boyle (1994) showed that morphological information and
pragmatic inferences interact in processing anaphors: their experiments
demonstrate that pragmatic inferences enhance or inhibit the processing of
anaphors even if morphological information is decisive on its own in solving
anaphors. Likewise, McKoon, Ward, Ratcliff & Sproat (1993) showed that
pragmatic and surface factors interact: in their experiments both the topicality
of the referents and the syntactic prominence of the antecedents turned out to be
equally important in determining the prominence of referents.
Finally, recent studies reveal that the prominence of referents is not only
determined by discourse oriented, contextual variables, but also by intrinsic
characteristics of referents. Hence, Fraurud (1996) distinguishes different
ontological types of referents (i.e. individuals, functionals and instances),
which are claimed to determine the choice between different types of referential
expressions. Likewise, results of the production experiments presented in Maes
(1997) indicate that - all other things being equal - abstract referents require
more ‘referential  force’ than concrete referents, which is claimed to be due to
their being less accessible by nature.
1.2 Cognitive discourse reference and evolutive reference
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The research attention described above is located mainly within the Anglo-
Saxon linguistic context. Largely apart from that, French linguists developed
fine-grained linguistic and philosophical discussions on an intriguing
referential phenomenon, i.e. evolutive reference. A large number of articles and
books discuss a variety of empirical data which show that the adequacy of
anaphoric expressions is somehow dependent on the ontological status or
evolution of the underlying discourse referent (e.g. Kleiber, Schnedecker &
Tyvaert 1996; De Mulder, 1995, Charolles & Schnedecker, 1993, Kleiber &
Riegel, to appear) The empirical topics and questions involved in this
discussion do not differ essentially from the topics which can be found in
recent Anglo-Saxon research on reference. In terms of the cognitive tradition
depicted in section 1.1, evolutive referents can be defined as (predominantly
prominent) discourse referents which fit in with the normal rules on focus and
attention, but which nevertheless cannot be referred to by an anaphoric
pronoun, due to a complex interaction of variables on different levels, such as
the ontology of the referents involved, the nature of the predicates and basic
characteristics of discourse, such as discourse intention and text type. There is,
however, a significant difference in the way in which the referential topic of
evolutive reference has been conceptualized, expressed theoretically and
embedded within the existing linguistic and philosophical traditions and
theories. So, one might conclude that the RQWRORJ\ of the topics involved in
recent French and Anglo-Saxon work on discourse anaphora is the same, and
that the main differences between the two traditions are SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO in
nature in that  they are caused by the way we look at these topics. 
Mainly because of the intrinsic similarity and the perspectival differences
between both referential traditions, it is worth our while to try to position part
of the discussion of evolutive referents within the framework of recent
cognitive theories of discourse reference. This way, we can examine whether
the cognitive framework promotes solutions for stubborn evolutive problems or
at least gives rise to interesting new research questions. 
1.3 Aim and survey
The aim of this article is to discuss the question of how an evolutive referent
can be defined from a cognitive point of view. What exactly transforms a
referent into an evolutive referent? What are the borderlines of evolutive
referents and what borderline discussions become visible when we try to walk
along the borderline in between ‘normal’ and evolutive referents? 
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This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a number of basics
which constitute the cognitive framework started from. In section 3, a tentative
cognitive definition of an evolutive referent  will be presented, followed by a
discussion of its main tenets. In section 4.1 and 4.2, the basic ingredient of the
definition, i.e. reconceptualization of referents, is discussed in relation to two
empirical cases which might be considered to be evolutive to a certain extent,
i.e. VHPDQWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ transformations and UROHYDOXH transformations. In
section 4.3, the usefulness of the notion of reconceptualization is illustrated in a
descriptive analysis of the different referential strategies within a corpus of 25
recipes for apple sauce taken from 25 different Dutch cookbooks.
2 A COGNITIVE VIEW OF DISCOURSE ANAPHORA
This section will briefly sums up a number of cognitive principles and claims,
which can be said to be the basis of the cognitive view of discourse reference
that I am taking for granted in discussing evolutive referents.
(i) LQFUHPHQWDWLRQ
Discourse participants are claimed to build successive representations of
successive discourse utterances. Successive discourse representations are said
to LQFUHPHQW each other. This means that each successive representation
replaces, changes and adds to the previous one. As far as the representation of
discourse referents is concerned, this means that successive representations
increment (i.e. expand, modify etc.) previous representations.
(ii) GLVFRXUVHUHIHUHQWVDVRUJDQL]LQJFRPSRQHQWVRIGLVFRXUVH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
Discourse referents are assumed to be the organizing components of discourse
representations: all discourse information is assumed to be stored with the
referent it belongs to. This characteristic reflects the intuition of discourse as
being about a particular (set of) referent(s), and is substantiated by
experimental results supporting the idea that attaching discourse information
’under’ discourse referents is a major task in discourse comprehension, see e.g.




Studying referential coherence in discourse requires uncovering the different
factors which determine the prominence or mental activation of referents. The
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form of referential expressions is assumed to be indicative of the accessibility
or mental activation of the underlying discourse referent.
(iv) WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOOHYHODVWKHFHQWUDODUHDRIOLQJXLVWLFUHVHDUFK
The cognitive view requires distinguishing between three levels of reference
associated with three levels of linguistic description:
& level 1 linguistic level, i.e. the level of referential (anaphoric)
expressions
& level 2 representational level, i.e. the level of discourse referents
& level 3 world level, i.e. the level of ‘real world’ entities.
Cognitively oriented linguistics should primarily account for linguistic (level 1)
phenomena as far as they are relevant for level 2, i.e. as far as they are relevant
and necessary for arriving at a coherent mental representation of discourse
(units). This means that the representational level contains somehow level 1
information (such as the linear succession of words and the semantic content of
the successive propositions), but also the necessary knowledge of the world
which is needed to interpret discourse. For example: the level 2 representation
of (2) does not only contain the linear order and semantic content of these two
sentences, but also the cause/consequence relationship between these two,
which can only be derived from our background world knowledge.
(2) It rains. It is getting wet.
The same goes for the following examples which have been used in a famous
experiment by Bransford, Barclay & Franks (1972). In this experiment, subjects
were asked to read a text and to carry out a decision task afterwards: they
received separate sentences and had to decide whether or not they had read
these sentences during the reading session. The results showed that subjects in
the decision task could discriminate easily between sentences (5) and (6),
whereas they could not discriminate between (3) and (4), although the surface
linguistic and the propositional difference between these two pairs is very much
the same. The explanation of this result is that (3) and (4) integrate within the
same mental picture, which we are able to compose on the basis of our
experience of the world, whereas (5) and (6) result in different situational
representations. This clearly shows that the integration of the textual
information into a coherent mental picture of the situation should be part of the
mental (level 2) representation of discourse.
(3) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath LW.
1 When we assume - however - that this example is only constructed for illustrative linguistic purposes and does
not really refer to an existing 3DXO, the ‘existing reading’ interpretation in (7) is not the intended one. The use of
3DXO does not intend to refer to a particular real world object, but to whatever stereotypic well-known familiar
individual human male referent that can be referred to by using the  first name 3DXO. This way, the example
shows the freedom we have in using language. Although Paul should normally refer to an existing entity,
apparently we are free to use these expressions the way we want to, e.g. to construct a revealing example in
support of a linguistic argument or to create an experimental poem about a prototype male person, in which cases
the mental representation of sentence 2 depends much more on the information of the first sentence, and not on
the knowledge of a real existing entity.
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(4) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath WKHP.
(5) Three turtles rested RQ a floating log and a fish swam beneath it.
(6) Three turtles rested EHVLGH a floating log and a fish swam beneath it.
For cognitive theories of reference, level 3 is relevant for linguistic theory, but
only indirectly, i.e. to the extent that it is transformed into fossilized world
knowledge and stored within the human mind, and hence to the extent that it is
accessible when we process discourse and construct mental representations. So,
when Kleiber argues in (7) in favor of the relevance of the real world level of
reference (level 3), a cognitive perspective on discourse reference would
require reformulating (7) as in (8):
(7) ‘Si je dis: 3DXOHVWHQWUp,OSRUWDLWXQFKDSHDX, il est aberrant de conclure
que le pronom  LO n’a pas pour vocation de renvoyer à un être existant
dans le monde, mais vise uniquement la représentation mentale élaborée
par la première phrase. (Kleiber, 1996:122)
(8) ‘Si je dis: 3DXOHVWHQWUp,OSRUWDLWXQFKDSHDX, il n’est pas aberrant de
conclure que le pronom  LO vise uniquement la représentation mentale
élaborée par la première phrase, à condition que l’interpretation de ‘être
un être existant dans le monde’ (et notamment un être connu par le
destinataire) est un élément indispensable de la représentation mentale de
LO. 
So, the level of mental representations would not be challenging for linguistic
theory, if it only contained the plain linguistic information explicitly provided
by the context. The way we use our ‘world knowledge’ in interpreting
discourse should necessarily be part of the mental representation. Applied to
(7), this means that the nature of the propositions and the choice of the first
name 3DXO as introductory expression, should result in a mental representation
of an existing, specific and familiar referent, one of the many we are supposed
to ‘really’ know. 1
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3 A COGNITIVE DEFINITION OF EVOLUTIVE REFERENTS (ERs)
3.1 A tentative definition
As a point of departure, I will take the following tentative definition of an
evolutive referent (ER). Starting from this definition, a number of interesting
demarcation problems and borderline conflicts become visible which might
help clarifying some of the stubborn problems associated with evolutive
referents:
7HQWDWLYHGHILQLWLRQRIDQHYROXWLYHUHIHUHQW(5
“An evolutive referent (ER) is a non-initial stage in the life cycle of a discourse
referent (DR), for which the following conditions hold:
a the attentional state (i.e. the prominence level or mental activation) of the
DR at that stage of its life cycle can be characterized as highly
prominent, accessible or activated,
b nevertheless, the DR cannot be referred to by a pronominal anaphor
which is congruent with its antecedent in number and gender,
c because the particular life cycle stage of the DR requires a
reconceptualization of the referent, which in most cases is due to a
conflict between descriptive features of the pronoun (e.g. male, female,
singular, plural) and ‘selection  restrictions’ associated with the predicate
with which the pronoun has to be combined.”
3.2 Real world entities vs discourse referents 
The definition starts from discourse referents (level-2 objects) instead of real
world entities. The background of this option is the idea that linguistic theory
should only be responsible for phenomena which ‘happen’ in discourse. In
other words, ‘evolutive’ real world entities (onions, caterpillars, dr. Jekyl....)
and events (turn into, slice, smash...) are irrelevant to linguistic theory XQWLO real
world entities are used as discourse referents and events are transformed into
predicates embedded within a particular discourse context. So, in order to talk
about an ER, ‘evolutive’ world entities (i) have to be transformed into discourse
referents and (ii) have to be embedded within a context which requires them to
be reconceptualized. The relevance of the second condition is demonstrated in
(9), where an (evolutive) real world entity is introduced in a discourse context
which does not reveal any ontological evolution and hence which does not
result in an ER.
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(9) Once there was an onion. On its way from the garden to the kitchen, he
fell off the wheelbarrow. So, he was never sliced, smashed, cut in pieces
etc. He lived a happy life in between the roses in the garden. 
3.3 Incrementation vs. evolution: the pronominalisation test?
The basis of our tentative definition is the difference between incrementation,
i.e. gradual informational expansion of discourse referents on the one hand, and
ontological evolution on the other. Incrementation is a basic requirement in
discourse since it implements the most important goal of using language, i.e.,
transferring and acquiring new and relevant knowledge. In (10), this
requirement is not met, which makes the text unacceptable.
(10) *Yesterday, 7RP+LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H walked in the street.
+H walked in the street. +H
Linguistic theory should enable us to discriminate between awkward texts such
as (10) and informative texts such as (11) - (16), and to explain the nature of
this difference. 
(11) Yesterday, 7RP+LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H went into a pub. +H
ordered a beer. +H
(12) Yesterday, 7RP+LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H was hit by a car. +H
lost his right arm. +H
(13) Yesterday, 7RP+LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H was hit by a car. +H
died a few hours later. +H / 7KH ERG\ / ,W ...
(14) Yesterday, 7RP +LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H was hit by a car. +LV
body was really smashed into applesauce. +H / 7KH ERG\ / ",W was taken
to hospital.
(15) Yesterday, 7RP +LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H turned into a woman.
+H really did not understand what happened. +H /"6KH looked at his new
body. ...
(16) Yesterday, 7RP +LQJVOH\ walked in the street. +H turned into a woman
and started a new life as Linda Hingsley. /LQGD / 6KH / +H moved to
Metz.
Apart from that, the question is whether linguistic theory should enable us to
make a difference between normal incrementation, as in (11), and ‘hard core’
cases of evolutive reference, as in (15) or (16), which are analogous to the well-
known evolutive examples involving RQLRQVVTXDUHVFKLFNHQVHJJVOLWWOH
2  It should be noted that these ‘core’ examples clearly differ as to their ‘ontological’ or ‘phenomenological’
nature and consequently as to the nature and characteristics of the evolutive reference they display. 
0$(6$FRJQLWLYHYLHZRIHYROXWLYHUHIHUHQWV S
SULQFHV'U-HN\OVetc.2  And if so, the question is whether the difference
between (15) - (16) on the one hand and (11) - (14) on the other is equally
categorical as the difference between (10) and the rest? Do the examples (11)-
(16) exhibit absolute or gradual differences? And where do we have to draw the
line between incrementation and evolution? And finally: on what level and in
which terms do we have to describe these empirical differences?
The tentative definition only enables us to raise questions like these, not to
answer them satisfactorily. The b-condition of the definition only suggests to
restrict evolutive reference to (16), being the example in which the DR 7RP
+LQJVOH\ can no longer be referred to by a pronominal anaphor which is
congruent with its antecedent in number and gender.
3.4 ERs and the attentional state of referents
The definition includes two conditions which interact with each other: (a) ERs
are said to be prominent, highly accessible discourse referents and (b) the
adequacy of pronominal reference is taken to be the touchstone or ‘litmus test’
for ‘ER-membership’. The reason for incorporating these conditions into the
definition of an ER is instrumental in nature: they provide us with a
methodological tool in that they enable us to discriminate between adequacy
problems caused by ‘normal’ contextual variables affecting the prominence of
referents (as they are given in section 1.1) and typical evolutive variables. The
inextricable mix of both types of variables makes it difficult to judge the
adequacy of (17), a nice example discussed in Charolles & Schnedecker
(1993:118) and Schnedecker & Charolles (1993:201) (see also Kleiber &
Riegel (@:)
(17) Marie traça un carré (P1). Elle dessina une étoile au milieu (P2). Elle la
découpa (P3) et ensuite elle le coloria en rouge (P4).
According to focal algorithms such as Centering Theory (e.g. Grosz et al,
1995), it is not so natural to pronominalize FDUUp in P4. In the clauses P2, P3
and P4, 0DULH is the most prominent entity, as it is continuously realized as
pronoun in subject position. /¶pWRLOH is the second most important element in
P2 and P3. /HFDUUp is not realized in these clauses and hence its reintroduction
in P4 is not naturally realized by an unmarked pronoun, even if it is
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unambiguous, especially because of the attention shift from O¶pWRLOHin P3 to OH
FDUUp in P4.
The conditions a and b do not tell us anything about the nature or the ontology
of an evolutive referent; they only provide us with a heuristic tool to distinguish
between evolutive and attentional mutations of discourse referents. So, these
conditions are not intended to prevent lowly-accessible referents nor non-
pronominal expressions from exhibiting referent evolution. They only express
the fact that evolutive reference phenomena show themselves typically in the
inadequacy of pronominal anaphors referring to prominent referents. 
But even if we consider these conditions as heuristic tools, they are not
unproblematic. First of all, there are many interesting cases of ‘pronominal’
evolution in discourse where the pronominalization test (condition b) fails, and
hence, which fall outside the scope of our definition. A clear example is the
ontological evolution involved in the propositional anaphora given in (18), an
example from Fraurud (1992:38). As the characterizations between brackets
show, in these sentences, the ontology of the referent changes profoundly and
fundamentally. But as all these evolutions can perfectly be covered by the
simple neutral LW, our definition does not apply.
(18) A newspaper wrote that WKHSUHVLGHQWZDVJRLQJWRUHVLJQ. 
Most people thought LW [SPEECH ACT] was a lie. 
They just could not believe LW [PROPOSITION]. 
Some took LW [SPEECH ACT] for an empty threat. 
But LW [PROPOSITION] actually turned out to be true. 
,W  [EVENT] happened the same day in the afternoon. 
,W [FACT] caused a political crisis.
Another problem is that using adequacy  judgments as a decisive test is not
always reliable. Language users can have different adequacy standards. There
are many different registers in language for which different adequacy standards
hold. Reasons for inadequacy can also be very diverse. A nice illustration of
this point is the observation in Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (manuscr.). They
notice that the use of indirect anaphors, such as LW in (19) occurs much more
frequently in unplanned than in planned discourse, which shows that adequacy
standards are different for different registers of language use. Even within the
same text type, different adequacy standards can be revealed, as the analysis of
the 25 recipes in section 4.3 will show. Observations like these make the
methodology expressed in the conditions a and b risky. 
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(19) Why is it that whenever the cat throws up, I’m the one that has to clean LW
up. (Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski, manuscr.)
3.5 Conceptualizing and reconceptualizing discourse referents 
The basic condition in the definition concerns the reconceptualization of a
discourse referent (condition c). This means that the development of the
discourse requires the initial conceptualization of the referent to be changed. A
plausible definition of the  LQLWLDOFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQof a DR is to consider it to
be the most minimal but adequate answer to question (20):
(20) ‘What discourse referent is this text about? 
The answer to this question can contain two types of information: firstly, NP-
information as it is entailed in the NP which initializes the referent in discourse;
it provides us with information on the semantic interpretation of the referent, on
the presumed initial familiarity status of the referent and on its ontological type.
Secondly, there is verbal information, i.e. information which is predicated to
the referent and which is needed in order to get a minimally relevant answer to
question (20).
The initial conceptualization depends to a large extent on the type of NP-
expression that is used to introduce the referent. As Fraurud (1996) points out,
proper names, definite descriptions and indefinite NPs represent different types
of ontology, i.e. individuals, functionals and instances respectively. The
adequacy differences in (21') and (22') show that they also exhibit a different
potential with regard to the initial conceptualization of a DR.
(21) <starting sentence, newspaper article> Yesterday, Jacques Chirac took a
plane to Muroroa...
(22) <starting sentence, newspaper article> Yesterday, a man took a plane to
Muroroa...
The minimal answer to (20) - and hence the initial conceptualization of the
discourse referent - is different for both sentences as the initial
conceptualization in (22’) needs more predicative information to produce a
minimally relevant answer than in (21’):
(21’) What is this article about? About Jacques Chirac.
(22’) What is the article about? 
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a *About a man.
b About a man who took a plane (to Muroroa).
It is important to note that the initial conceptualization of a DR is determined
by the way the DR is presented in discourse. The way it is presented will often
be similar to or based on the stereotypic way we look at world entities, i.e. what
Kleiber calls O¶pWDWVWpUpRW\SLTXH (Kleiber, 1996:140), but it should be clear that
O¶pWDWVWpUpRW\SLTXH always has to pass through the filter of the way in which we
want to present the referent in discourse. So, O¶pWDWVWpUpRW\SLTXH does not
determine directly the way we conceptualize a discourse referent, but only
indirectly, as the conceptualization  always depends on the rhetorical freedom
of language users to introduce referents according to their own aims and
demands. Thus, both (21) and (22) can be used to introduce a newspaper article
about Jacques Chirac, but in (22) we might have a rhetorical reason not to use
the most stereotypical way of introducing the referent. 
According to condition c, a reconceptualization of the referent is triggered by a
clash between descriptive features of the pronoun (e.g. male, female, singular,
plural) and ‘selection  restrictions’ associated with the predicate with which the
pronoun has to be combined. This definition might suggest that it nicely covers
and explains all cases of evolutive reference presented in the literature. This
however, is much more ambitious than the definition is aiming at. Rather, it
should be regarded solely as an initial attempt to grasp at least one essential
characteristic of what evolutive reference should be from a cognitive point of
view. Instead of discussing in detail the robustness of this definition in relation
to the existing body of empirical cases and examples, I want to use the
definition and the notion of reconceptualization in a discussion of two
empirical cases which might be considered to be evolutive to a certain extent,
i.e. VHPDQWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ transformations (4.1) and UROHYDOXH
transformations (4.2). After that, the usefulness of the notion of
reconceptualization is discussed in relation to a corpus of 25 recipes for apple
sauce, coming from 25 different Dutch cookbooks (4.3).
4 APPLYING THE TENTATIVE DEFINITION
4.1 Semantic interpretation transformations
One of the major ontological characteristics of a discourse referent is its
semantic interpretation: a referent can be VSHFLILF or QRQVSHFLILF, JHQHULF or
QRQJHQHULF LQVWDQWLDWHG or QRQLQVWDQWLDWHG etc. If we look at the evolution of
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referents as pertaining to the ontological level of referents, changes in the
semantic interpretation might well be considered to be instances of ERs,
although they do not constitute standard cases. Furthermore, discussing the
semantic interpretation of discourse referents in relation to evolutive reference
enables us to refine the difference between initial and non-initial stages in the
life cycle of referents and hence between conceptualization and
reconceptualization.
If we look at (23) and (24), we can conclude that the initial conceptualization of
the referent is the same, as can be seen in the identical answer to the test
question in (23’) and (24’). But this conceptualization is semantically
indeterminate or ambiguous, as its interpretation can be specific or not specific.
It is the predicative information in the second sentence in (23) and (24) that
disambiguates the VSHFLILF/QRQVSHFLILF interpretation of the referent. In
evolutive terms, one might argue that between the first and second sentence in
(23) and (24) an evolutive process takes place, from an indeterminate ‘VSHFLILF
RUQRQVSHFLILF¶ referent to an unambiguous µVSHFLILF’ (23) or µQRQVSHFLILF¶
(24) referent. 
(23) Sorry sir, I am looking for DPDQZLWKWKUHHOHJV. +H is 10 foot tall and
wears a red hat.
(23') What is this text about? About (me, looking for) a man with three legs.
(24) Sorry sir, I am looking for DPDQZLWKWKUHHOHJV. It doesn’t matter how
tall KH is, or what color of hat KH wears.
(24') What is this text about? About (me, looking for) a man with three legs.
But according to our definition, there is no ER involved here. The pronoun KH
in the second sentence is perfectly able to switch from the ambiguous to the
unambiguous interpretation, which is quite natural as the referent interpretation
in the second sentence falls within the scope of the semantic indeterminate
interpretation of the first sentence. So, in these cases we might speak of a
delayed initial conceptualization of the referent. This is no longer the case in
(25)-(30).They show that once a referent has been conceptualized
unambiguously within a particular semantic interpretation and ontological
category, it is impossible to use pronouns in order to switch to another semantic
interpretation of the referent. This observation makes them more ER-like,
although the contexts involved do not contain a transformational predicate.
(25) John likes KLVWZRGRJV(specific). 
a 7KH\7KHVHDQLPDOV (specific: his two dogs) are close to his heart.
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b 7KH\"7KHVHDQLPDOV'RJV (generic: dogs in general) are close
to his heart
(26) John likes GRJV (generic).
a 7KH\ (generic: dogs in general) are close to his heart.
b 7KH\ (specific: his two dogs) are close to his heart.
c ")LGRDQG*HUDOG are close to his heart.
(27) There is DER\ (specific) climbing that tree. 7KRVHER\s / 7KH\(generic)
are always getting into mischief. (Halliday & Hasan, 1976:283, Bowdle
& Ward, 1995).
(28) $PDQZLWKWKUHHOHJV doesn’t exist (non-specific, non-existing).
a +H (non-specific, non-existing) would never be able to maintain
himself in whatever society.
b +H (specific, existing) is 10 foot tall and wears a red hat.
(29) $PDQZLWKWKUHHOHJV is walking in the street (specific, existing).
a +H (specific, existing) is 10 foot tall and wears a red hat.
b +H (non-specific, non-existing) would never be able to maintain
himself in whatever society.
(30) We can therefore associate with HDFKSRLQW    (non-instantiated) near the
earth a vector J which is the acceleration that a body would experience if
it where released at WKLVSRLQW    / "WKHUH (instantiated) (Sidner, 1983:325)
4.2 Role-value transformations 
A second class of phenomena which are related to evolutive reference are so-
called UROHYDOXH cases, since they can exhibit ontological conflicts between the
grammatical gender of the role/function name and the semantic/biological
gender of the value that fills the role. This conflict is the basis of the following
brainteaser.
(31) A young man is driving in a car together with his father. The car crashes.
The father dies immediately. The young man is taken to hospital for an
emergency operation. The surgeon is called in, enters the operating room,
sees the young man and says to the rest of the staff in the room: I cannot
do this job: he is my son.
 
Most role denominators with a masculine gender (such as VXUJHRQ)
automatically evoke a male value. Even if a male interpretation is excluded - in
(31) because the father is dead - language users decide spontaneously to judge
(31) as being odd rather than automatically switch to a female value
interpretation, i.e. the mother in (31). Because of the possible ambiguity
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between grammatical and semantic gender, these role denominators (VXUJHRQ,
SULPHPLQLVWHU etc.) are evolutive in nature. They show an ontological change
between type-like and token-like discourse referents. As with the semantic
interpretation cases, the behavior of anaphoric pronouns in these contexts sheds
light on the difference between initial conceptualization and
reconceptualization of discourse referents and on the validity of our tentative
ER-definition. Example (32) shows that pronouns are perfectly able to
disambiguate a potentially ambiguous or indeterminate initial conceptualization
of the referent. Even if the initial conceptualization is very much biased toward
one particular biological gender, a pronoun is fairly well able to overrule this
bias. 
(32) On the occasion of the national celebration day tomorrow, WKH3ULPH
0LQLVWHU (masculin role, male value or female value) will pay an official
visit to the royal palace. 
a +H (masculin role or male value) will receive the national medal of
honor.
b 6KH (female value) will receive the national medal of honor.
But, as in the semantic interpretation cases, once the referent has been
conceptualized unambiguously, subsequent anaphoric pronouns should be
consistent with this conceptualization. 
(33) On the occasion of the national celebration day tomorrow, WKHSULPH
PLQLVWHU (masculine role, male value or female value) will pay an official
visit to the royal palace. 
a 6KH (female value) will receive the medal of honor, because VKH
(female value) /KH (masculine role or male value) successfully
combines two very important functions: that of prime minister and
that of lovely mother of three daughters.
b 6KH (female value) will receive the medal of honor, because VKH
(female value) / KH (masculine role or male value) managed to
balance the national budget.
c +H (masculine role OR male value) will receive the medal of
honor, because VKH (female value) managed to balance the
national budget.
d +H (masculine role OR male value) will receive the medal of
honor, because VKH (female value) successfully combines two
very important functions: that of prime minister and that of lovely
mother of three daughters.
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The a and b version of (33) show that a pronoun is not able to switch a female
value conceptualization (realized by the feminine pronoun in the second
sentence) into a male value interpretation or back to the initial masculin role
interpretation: the masculin pronoun in the third sentence is unacceptable, not
only when the predicative information in this sentence is incompatible with the
male value - as in (33a) - but also when it is ‘sex neutral’ - as in (33b). The c
and d versions show that conceptualizing the referent by using a masculine
pronoun seems to implicate not only a masculine role but also a male value
interpretation of the referent: the fact is that the feminine pronoun in the third
sentence results in inadequacy, not only when the predicative information is
‘sex neutral’ - as in (33c) -  but also when the predicative information
‘ontologically’ requires a female value interpretation, as in (33d). 
The different versions in (33) show where initial conceptualization ends and
reconceptualization begins. Moreover, they show that the reconceptualization
of a referent is not always triggered by the incompatibility between descriptive
features of the pronoun and predicate information, but also by the persistence
of the initial conceptualization of the referent. This - however - does not alter
the fact that the clash between descriptive pronominal features and predicates
can be decisive in forcing a reconceptualization of the referent, as (34) shows.
(34) On the occasion of the national celebration day tomorrow, WKHSULPH
PLQLVWHU will pay an official visit to the royal palace. 7KHSULPHPLQLVWHU
will receive the medal of honor, because VKH /  KH successfully combines
two very important functions: that of prime minister and that of lovely
mother of three daughters.
4.3 Conceptualization and reconceptualization of apples and apple sauce
Thus far, I have tried to make clear that an evolutive referent is a prominent
referent, that it is a non-initial state of a DR and that the notion of
reconceptualization is the core of referent evolution. Furthermore, I have tried
to demonstrate that VHPDQWLFLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ and UROHYDOXHcases not only
enable us to clearly discriminate between initial conceptualization and
reconceptualization, but also deserve more attention and further discussion
within the framework of evolutive reference. 
 
By way of conclusion and in order to illustrate the freedom of choice and the
many parameters involved in (not) reconceptualizing referents, I want to report
a brief  survey of the different strategic choices of conceptualization and
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reconceptualization which can be found in a corpus of 25 recipes for apple
sauce, coming from 25 different Dutch cookbooks. The Dutch cookbooks were
randomly selected from the repertory of Dutch cookbooks for adults. Opting for
apple sauce was motivated by the intention to pick out a recipe with one clear
protagonist (i.e. the apple) which has to be transformed in order to result in
always the same end product (i.e. apple sauce). Taking the same simple recipe
enabled us to focus on the comparison of writing strategies rather than on the
comparison of recipe contents or cooking quality.
D EDVLFVWUDWHJ\Q 
The most common strategy in the recipes is that the initial conceptualization of
the referent (GHDSSHOV ‘the apples’) is established and maintained (by using the
plural pronoun ]H ‘them’ or a literal repetition) during the first manipulations
(peeling, washing, cutting in pieces, cooking). The reconceptualization is
triggered by the crucial transformation of apples being cooked to a pulp or
pushed through a sieve. This predicate, sometimes supplemented with an
explicit re-identification statement (DSSOHVWXUQLQWRDSSOHVDXFH) results in a
new conceptualization (PRHV ‘apple sauce’) and ditto feminine singular anaphor
(]H ‘she/it’). The basic pattern can be represented and illustrated schematically
as follows:
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(35) Basic life cycle phases of DSSOHV in apple sauce recipe














‘Peel or wash WKHDSSOHV and cut
WKHP in four. Put WKHDSSOHV on
the fire in water, and bring them
to the boil for 15 minutes’ 















The corpus, however,  shows a variety of alternative ways of expressing the life
cycle of the referent, either alternative reconceptualization patterns (b-e), or
patterns without reconceptualization (f-h).
E 5HFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQZLWKRXWH[SOLFLWWUDQVIRUPDWLRQSUHGLFDWHQ 
The transformation of apples into sauce does not necessarily have to be expressed
explicitly in a transformation predicate, but can be implied situationally by using
less explicit predicates: in (36) phase B is absent, the predicate FRRNLQJDSSOHV





‘Take RYHUULSHRUVSHFLDOFRRNLQJDSSOHV. Wash WKHDSSOHV, wipe
WKHP dry and cut WKHP with skin and core in 4 cm pieces. Remove
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the calix. Cook WKHDSSOHV for 20 minutes in water and lemon juice




‘Push the hot sauce through a sieve. With a hand mixer it is no
problem at all. Mix WKHVDXFH with the sugar and spoon LW as hot as
possible in the jars.’
F UHFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQDVDJHQHULFUHIHUHQWQ 
In two recipes, the referent is reconceptualized as a generic (GHDSSHO), as can be
seen in (37). This generic reconceptualization cuts across the three phases of the





‘Peel WKHDSSOHV, remove the cores and cut the flesh in cubes. Put WKH
DSSOH with 1 dl of water in an ovenproof dish with a content of 1 1/2
liter.’
B HQNRRNGHDSSHOHQLQPLQXWHQRSWRWPRHV
‘and cook WKHDSSOHV in 5-6 minutes to a pulp.’
C 5RHUGHDSSHOKDOYHUZHJHGHEHUHLGLQJHHQNHHUGRRU%UHQJGH
DSSHOPRHVRSVPDDNPHWVXLNHU
‘Stir in WKHDSSOH well. Flavor WKHDSSOHVDXFH with sugar.’
d repeated reconceptualization (n=2)
In two recipes, the referent is reconceptualized more than once. In (38) for
example, DSSOHV are reconceptualized in phase A as SLHFHVRIDSSOHV referred at by





‘Peel DSSOHV and cut in four. Remove the cores and cut the flesh in
pieces.




‘Crush WKHSLHFHVRIDSSOHagainst the side of the dish.’
C HQKHWPRHVWHQVORWWHPHWVXLNHURSVPDDNEUHQJHQ
‘and finally flavor WKHVDXFH with sugar.’
 
H µIODVKEDFN¶WRWKHLQLWLDOFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQQ 
At the end of two recipes, the reconceptualized referent (DSSOHVDXFH) returns in




‘Wash WKHDSSOHV or brush WKHP clean, cut WKHPwith peel and cores
in pieces (WKHDSSOHV can also be used peeled and without cores) and
bring WKHP to the boil with a little water.’
B /DDW]HWRWPRHVNRNHQLQjPLQXWHQ




‘push WKLV through a sieve and mix LW with sugar. Sprinkle as desired
cinnamon on LW or cook a piece of lemon peel together with WKH
DSSOHV¶
I µKLGGHQ¶PDLQWHQDQFHRILQLWLDOFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQQ  
The main referent in the recipes is not always reconceptualized. One way of
avoiding reconceptualization is maintaining reference by means of zero-anaphora,









‘Cook a thin syrup from a little bit of water, sugar, the juice and the
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rasped peel of a lemon. Then you are going to peel \RXUDSSOHV. Cut
in little pieces, WKHDSSOHgoes in the syrup. 7KHILUVWDSSOH has a
longer swimming time than WKHODVWRQH. Stir now and then with a
wooden spoon. When WKHODVWDSSOH disappears in the pan, we




‘Stir once more, try it, if necessary add lemon or sugar and let cool
down without cover.’
J µRYHUW¶PDLQWHQDQFHRIWKHLQLWLDOFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQQ 
The initial conceptualisation of a discourse referent can be maintained during the
recipe by means of overt pronouns, even in combination with explicit




‘Peel WKHDSSOHV, cut WKHP in four, remove the cores. Put on the fire
with the water and the lemon peel and cook WKHP to a pulp in about
15 minutes.’
B :ULMI]HGDQILMQGRRUHHQSDDUGHKDUHQ]HHI
‘Push WKHP through a horsehair sieve.’
C YRHJGHVXLNHUWRHHQQDDUYHUNLH]LQJKHWFLWURHQVDSGRH]HLQHHQ
VFKDDOHQODDW]HNRXGZRUGHQ
‘Add the sugar and as desired the lemon juice, put WKHP in a dish and
let WKHP cool down.’
K H[SOLFLWUHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHLQLWLDOFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQQ 
The initial conceptualisation can not only be maintained by means of a pronoun
but also re-established by means of a literal repetition (DSSOHV), even after an
explicit transformation predicate:
(42) A 'HDSSHOHQVFKLOOHQLQYLHUHQVQLMGHQYDQNORNKXL]HQRQWGRHQ
‘Peel WKHDSSOHV, cut in four, remove the cores’
B HQPHWZDWHUHQFLWURHQVFKLOYOXJWRWPRHVNRNHQ]RQGHUURHUHQ





‘(Remove the lemon peel). Stir WKHDSSOHV to a pulp and finish with
sugar. If WKHDSSOHV have little taste, flavour WKHDSSOHVDXFH with
lemon juice or cinnamon.’
In sum, the different strategies exhibited in this small corpus of apple sauce
recipes show that language users have a large leeway in whether, when and how
to reconceptualize a referent. Even in predicative contexts which are perfectly
suited to referent evolution, language users can prefer continuation strategies over
reconceptualization strategies.
5 CONCLUSION
The different aspects of the tentative cognitive definition of evolutive referents
enabled us not only to discuss a number of topics in the field of evolutive
referents, but also to show that these topics are relevant also within the
perspective of recent Anglo-Saxon literature on discourse reference. This is not to
say that the article resulted in definitive answers on what evolutive referents are
and how anaphoric processes involving evolutive referents have to be explained.
But it shows that recent French and Anglo-Saxon work in the field of reference
deserves more collaborative effort, as both traditions can reveal complementary
facets of the same conglomerate of (evolutive) referential phenomena in
discourse.
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